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Abstract 
 
This paper considers Hermann Hesse’s novel, The Glass Bead Game, in the light of 
Paulo Freire’s educational philosophy.  The Glass Bead Game is set in Castalia, a 
“pedagogical province” of the 23rd century.  It is argued that the central character in 
the book, Joseph Knecht, undergoes a complex process of conscientisation.  Knecht 
develops an increasingly critical understanding of Castalian society, questioning some 
of its most cherished assumptions while nonetheless deepening his appreciation of the 
beauty of the Glass Bead Game.  He becomes less certain of his certainties as he 
grows older, and eventually decides to give away his prestigious post as Magister 
Ludi (Master of the Glass Bead Game) to pursue a quiet life as a tutor.  Dialogue 
plays a key role in the development of Knecht’s critical consciousness.  Freirean 
theory is seen to provide a robust framework for the analysis of key themes in Hesse’s 
text.  At the same time, The Glass Bead Game is helpful in demonstrating the 
meaning and significance of conscientisation and dialogue for educational lives. 
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Introduction 
 
Paulo Freire wrote primarily as an educational philosopher, political activist and 
teacher.  He was a theorist and a practitioner, not a novelist or dramatist.  It would not 
be unreasonable to claim that Freire’s later publications exhibit certain literary 
qualities.  Several of his books were constructed in the form of dialogues (e.g., Freire 
and Shor, 1987; Horton and Freire, 1990; Freire and Faundez, 1989) or letters (e.g., 
Freire, 1996, 1998a), and one recently published volume (Freire, 2004) includes a 
poem Freire wrote in 1971.  Even the texts Freire composed in a more traditional 
academic format during his post-1986 writing period have, at least in some cases 
(e.g., Freire, 1994, 1997a, 1998b), a more “conversational” tone than most books 
published by theorists in critical educational studies.  Yet, despite these departures 
from scholarly orthodoxy, it is clear that Freire’s primary intention as an author was 
to develop, convey and discuss his educational ideas via the medium of non-fiction 
prose.  The thinkers to whom Freire has referred in his work have, similarly, been 
predominantly (but not exclusively) non-fiction writers.  Freire’s commentators have 
tended to follow suit, and hundreds of theoretical books and articles on Freirean 
themes have been published over the past four decades.  Among philosophers of 
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education in particular, Freire has typically been engaged via the work of other 
scholars who have read, reflected on and published non-fiction academic writing. 
 
Arguably, however, there is much that might be gained from putting Freirean ideas 
into conversation with writing of other forms.  Freire has sometimes been criticised 
for the somewhat abstract nature of his written expression.  This line of critique has 
been directed principally at his classic work, Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire, 
1972a).  The criticism becomes less convincing when Pedagogy of the Oppressed is 
read alongside other books with a strong practical focus (e.g., Freire 1976, 1998a; 
Freire and Shor, 1987; Horton and Freire, 1990).  Nonetheless, even where Freire 
shows how his ideas might be, or have been, applied in (and developed from) 
practice, there is often still something missing.  We cannot “get inside the heads” of 
those who think, feel and act out the drama that is their educational lives.  The limits 
of the scholarly form, even as stretched by Freire in his more conversational style, do 
not allow us to explore the particulars – the circumstances, the interactions, the 
relationships, the inner workings – of an educational situation or individual life in the 
manner permitted by some other forms of writing.  Novels, by taking us into the 
hearts and minds of characters, provide an especially helpful means through which to 
explore the nature and significance of ethical, epistemological and educational ideas 
for human lives (cf. Nussbaum, 1990, 1995; Katz, 1997; Carr, 2005; Jollimore and 
Barrios, 2006).  Imaginative fiction is, of course, not the only potentially fruitful 
avenue for this kind of investigation.  The medium of film, for example, might serve 
equally well.  But the novel is a form that lends itself particularly well to the 
exploration of key themes in Freire’s philosophy and pedagogy. 
 
One book with special promise in this area is Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game 
(Hesse, 2000a).  Education figures prominently in a number of Hesse’s novels (e.g., 
Hesse, 1968, 1999, 2000b).  Hesse also addressed educational questions in some of 
his short stories (see Hesse, 1974a) and non-fiction writings (Hesse, 1974b, 1978).  It 
is in The Glass Bead Game, however, that his most comprehensive, complex and 
probing examination of an educational setting occurs.  The Glass Bead Game was 
Hesse’s last and longest novel.  Hesse agonised over the book, taking more than ten 
years to complete it (see Field, 1968; Mileck, 1970; Norton, 1976; Remys, 1983).  It 
was first published (as Das Glasperlenspiel) in 1943 and appeared in English 
translation (originally under the title Magister Ludi) in 1949.  Shortly after the 
publication of the book Hesse was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.  The main 
part of The Glass Bead Game tells the story of Joseph Knecht, who spends most of his 
life in Castalia, a “pedagogical province” of the 23rd century.  Castalia places a 
premium on intellectual pursuits, at the centre of which is the Glass Bead Game.  The 
exact workings of the Glass Bead Game in its 23rd century form remain uncertain, but 
the narrator informs us that the Game is like a universal language: a way of 
connecting traditions and cultures from both the East and the West and of playing 
with all disciplines and values.  Castalia is a hierarchical society, with students at 
different levels of schooling and Masters of the various arts.  At the summit of the 
Order of the Glass Bead Game is the Magister Ludi (Master of the Game).  Knecht 
progresses through the school system in Castalia, studies the Game deeply, and is 
eventually appointed Magister Ludi.  He exercises his responsibilities in this position 
with distinction but as time passes he becomes increasingly critical of Castalia’s 
rigidity, restrictiveness and separation from the rest of the world.  Doubts that have 
been present since his student days find their ultimate expression in his dramatic and 
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difficult decision to resign his post as Magister Ludi.  He seeks permission from the 
Board of Educators to leave the Order, and dedicates himself to the task of tutoring 
Tito, the son of his old friend Plinio.  This process barely begins, however, when 
Knecht dies suddenly while swimming with Tito in an icy mountain lake.  The main 
part of the book is preceded by the narrator’s general introduction to the history of the 
Game, and is followed by thirteen poems and three fictional autobiographies 
(presented as the posthumous writings of Joseph Knecht). 
 
At the centre of The Glass Bead Game is the educational transformation of Joseph 
Knecht.  But what kind of transformation occurs and how does this come about?  
Freire’s educational philosophy is helpful in addressing this question.  Knecht’s 
transformation, it will be argued here, can be seen as a process of conscientisation, 
through which a dedicated scholar and loyal citizen of Castalia gradually develops an 
increasingly critical view of the pedagogical province.  Dialogue plays a crucial role 
in shaping Knecht’s reflective, questioning orientation toward the world.  Freirean 
theory, I hope to show, allows us to reflect carefully on the nature of Castalian 
society, appreciate more deeply the experiences of Hesse’s characters, and better 
understand the educational significance of the book.  At the same time, Hesse’s novel 
permits aspects of Freire’s work to be considered in a fresh light and explored more 
fully. 
 
 
The concept of conscientisation 
 
Conscientisation is one of the best known but most frequently misunderstood aspects 
of Freire’s work.  In early publications (Freire, 1972b, 1976), Freire discusses 
conscientisation – conscientização in the original Portuguese – in relation to different 
groups within Brazilian society.  He describes three modes of consciousness, or ways 
of thinking and being: magical (semi-intransitive), naïve (transitive) and critical.  
Magical consciousness prevailed among rural peasant communities, and was 
characterised by a fatalistic attitude, a lack of historical awareness and a focus on 
survival.  Naïve consciousness was predominant in the urban centres that emerged in 
Brazil following the Second World War.  Its defining features included an emphasis 
on polemics rather than argument, the oversimplification of problems, and a lack of 
interest in investigation and dialogue.  Critical consciousness was characteristic of 
“authentically democratic regimes” and included elements such as depth in the 
interpretation and addressing of problems, the testing of findings and openness to 
revision, a willingness to accept responsibility, sound argumentation, the practice of 
dialogue, and acceptance of “what is valid in both old and new” (Freire, 1976, p. 18).  
Conscientisation consisted in the movement from either magical or naïve 
consciousness toward critical consciousness.  Education, Freire believed, could play a 
key role in facilitating this process. 
 
This early depiction of different modes of consciousness has been taken by some as 
an indication that Freire intended conscientisation to be seen in terms of clear-cut, 
progressive levels or “stages”.  Removed from its original context, conscientisation 
has sometimes been applied as a means for describing a process of individual 
development through fixed, sequential stages of consciousness (e.g., Smith, 1976).  
As has been argued elsewhere (Roberts, 2000), the “stages” model of conscientisation 
has some significant epistemological problems.  The characterisation of 
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conscientisation as a process of “consciousness raising” (e.g., Berger, 1974) leads to 
further difficulties.  This suggests a hierarchy of consciousnesses, ignoring the 
cultural specificity of different modes of knowing and being.  Some ways of 
understanding the world, it can be argued, are more helpful than others – but only in 
certain contexts and for particular purposes.  The depictions of magical and naïve 
consciousness were Freire’s attempt to capture prevailing patterns of thought and 
attitudes among different groups of Brazilians during specific periods of that 
country’s history.  Freire’s focus was not on individuals, and he did not see magical 
consciousness, naïve consciousness and critical consciousness as pre-defined levels or 
stages – that is, as universal categories, applicable to all people at all times and in all 
circumstances.  With the enormous interest in Freire’s work following the publication 
of Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Freire, 1972a), conscientisation came to be seen as a 
kind of “magic bullet”: a revolutionary pedagogical “method” capable of eliminating 
oppression where other approaches had failed.  Freire disavowed such readings.  He 
insisted that conscientisation is not a panacea for social ills (Freire, 1998b, p. 55).  He 
stressed that his philosophy and pedagogy could not be reduced to a “method” or even 
a set of methods (Freire, 1997b).  He reinforced the view that conscientisation was a 
complex, multifaceted, ongoing process, and that it could only be understood in 
relation to other key concepts in his work such as dialogue and praxis.  He 
emphasised the limits as well as the possibilities in educational initiatives.  In the end, 
frustrated with what he saw as persistent misunderstandings of his intentions, Freire 
largely abandoned the term “conscientisation”.  From the late 1970s to the mid 1980s 
he seldom discussed conscientisation in any detail.  In later publications (e.g., Freire, 
1996, 1997a, 1998b, 2004), he returned to the concept, this time integrating it with a 
wider body of theory generated through his dialogical encounters with other scholars 
such as Ira Shor (Freire and Shor, 1987), Myles Horton (Horton and Freire, 1990) and 
Antonio Faundez (Freire and Faundez, 1989). 
 
While the notion of conscientisation has been subject to considerable controversy and 
confusion over the years, some of its key features have been clearly evident from 
Freire’s earliest writings.  Conscientisation can be seen as the process of developing a 
critical consciousness, particularly but not exclusively in relation to social structures, 
practices and prevailing ideas.  The deepening of one’s understanding of society 
through conscientisation involves, among other things, learning to place social 
problems in their broader contexts, establishing relationships between different 
phenomena, and appreciating the historical nature of human existence.  
Conscientisation does not take place through fixed, inevitable, irreversible stages; 
rather, it occurs as “a process at any given moment” (Freire, 1985, p. 107).  Freire 
does not portray conscientisation in a linear fashion but instead stresses the fluid, 
dynamic nature of the process.  It is not a matter of first developing a critical 
consciousness, and then engaging in action, and through this bringing about social 
transformation.  In the process of conscientisation reflection and action are necessarily 
intertwined.  For Freire, all aspects of reality are in motion.  There is a constant 
interaction between “consciousness” and “world” (Freire, 1972b).  Given this process 
of incessant change, one can, at best, only come closer to understanding a given 
object of study (Freire and Shor, 1987).  If the “object of study” in the process of 
conscientisation is the social world, Freire recognises that there is no one legitimate 
way of comprehending the problems in that world.  What conscientisation demands of 
us is that we strive to deepen and extend our current understanding.  This requires the 
application of intellectual virtues, such as a willingness to question (without assuming 
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that everything needs to be questioned all the time), a probing and inquiring stance 
when faced with a problem, open-mindedness, curiosity, and a certain humility 
(recognising, among other things, that we cannot “know it all” and that there is always 
more to learn). 
 
Conscientisation has ontological, epistemological, ethical, and educational 
dimensions.  Conscientisation is, Freire argues, fundamental to our very being as 
humans.  It is “a requirement of our human condition” (Freire, 1998b, p. 55).  The 
form conscientisation takes, however, will differ from one context to another.  
Developing a critical consciousness involves seeking to know oneself, others and the 
world.  Knowing here, as Freire describes it, is more than mere surface 
comprehension.  It is a process of striving to delve beneath surface appearances, of 
endeavouring to understand an object of study rigorously.  This is not an abstract, 
purely cognitive process, separated from the rest of the world.  Rather, knowing is an 
intensely practical process, intertwined with the messy realities of everyday life.  
Knowing, as Freire conceives of it, is something one engages in with one’s whole 
being – with feeling, willing and action as well as with reason (see Freire, 1997a, p. 
30).  Seeking to know in this manner demands ethical and political commitment.  
Conscientisation, as the term suggests, involves the cultivation of not just a certain 
kind of critical awareness but of conscience (Freire, 2004, p. 78).  The key to enacting 
this process in an educational setting, Freire argued, is critical dialogue.  Freire argues 
that as humans we are beings of communication (see Freire, 1976, 1996, 1998b, 
2004), and that dialogue is a crucial part of the process of becoming more fully 
human.  Educational dialogue is not mere idle conversation; rather, it is purposeful 
and rigorous, with a clear sense of structure and direction (see further, Freire and 
Shor, 1987; Mayo, 1999; Roberts, 2000).  Dialogical education focuses on posing and 
addressing problems rather than giving answers; it draws, and reflects critically, on 
the knowledge and experience of participants; and it assumes that knowledge is not 
static but ever evolving (Freire, 1972a).  Critical dialogue fosters a better 
understanding of “self” and “society”, enhances the appreciation of “otherness”, and 
allows participants to develop a deeper awareness of themselves as unfinished beings. 
 
 
Uncertainty, critical thought and social life 
 
Conscientisation requires a willingness to live with, and indeed embrace, uncertainty.  
In his later works, Freire spoke often of the need not to become too certain of one’s 
certainties.  This does not mean that nothing can be taken as given for particular 
purposes.  Freire acknowledged that we must take certain things for granted in order 
to make decisions and take action as human beings.  Freire’s point is that if reality is 
constantly changing, we too can never completely “stand still”; our understanding of 
the world must always be open to change.  Freire explains: 
 
I have been always engaged with many thoughts concerning the challenges 
that draw me to this or that issue or to the doubts that make me unquiet.  These 
doubts take me to uncertainties, the only place where it is possible to work 
toward the necessary provisional certainties.  It is not the case that it is 
impossible to be certain about some things.  What is impossible is to be 
absolutely certain, as if the certainty of today were the same as that of 
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yesterday and will continue to be the same as that of tomorrow.  (Freire, 
1997a, pp. 30-31). 
 
The Glass Bead Game, through the life of Joseph Knecht, demonstrates the 
importance of uncertainty and critical thought – not just for individuals, but for groups 
and indeed whole societies.  Castalia, Hesse’s novel shows, is in a state of decay as a 
society precisely because most of its citizens fail to question its structures, its system 
of education, and its superiority over other societies.  The hierarchical nature of 
Castalian society encourages order and conformity.  Castalians have little respect for 
history, and while they believe themselves to have gone beyond the follies of the 
Feuilleton Age (the first half of the 20th century), they have not learned from some of 
the mistakes made in that period.  They are, in Freirean terms, too certain of their 
certainties.  They seek to uphold some traditions but abandon others too quickly.  
They do not have, as Freire puts it, either a willingness to consider the new or the 
good sense not to abandon the old just because it is old (Freire, 1976, p. 18).  When 
faced with challenges, many Castalians withdraw further into the protective confines 
of the pedagogical province or respond with coldness and incomprehension.  Those 
within the Order who do not conform lead a precarious existence (as is the case with 
Tegularius, Joseph’s over-sensitive but brilliant friend), and are sometimes treated 
with outright contempt and brutality (as occurs with Bertram, the deputy of the 
Magister Ludi in office just prior to Knecht’s investiture: see Friedrichsmeyer, 1974). 
 
In some important respects, Castalia provides largely unfriendly soil for the 
cultivation of a critical mode of being.  There is, as Durrani (1982) argues, a naïve 
quality to some of the analytical statements by even the most admirable characters.  
The Music Master is perhaps the most striking example: 
 
It is beyond doubt … that in the Magister Musicae Hesse has created a good, 
almost a saintly figure.  In his serenity, his goodwill towards Knecht, and his 
unpretentious devotion to art, he appeals to the reader as an emblem of all that 
is best in the province.  But although he may be above criticism as a human 
being, it is equally true that he is naively optimistic about the organization to 
which he belongs, and blind to its defects.  (p. 660) 
 
Knecht constitutes an exception to the rule in Castalia (Swales, 1978; Roberts, 
2008/in press).  This does not mean that the pedagogical province has played no role 
in the cultivation of his critical consciousness.  Castalia plays a part in providing the 
culture of intellectual discipline necessary for carefully structured, in-depth reflection.  
Knecht learns through his involvement with the Glass Bead Game and his interactions 
with other Castalians the value of reasoning, deliberation and contemplation.  
Reflective reasoning allows him to make the unprecedented decision to relinquish his 
role as Magister Ludi and to leave the Order of the Glass Bead Game.  Knecht’s 
Circular Letter to the Board of Educators, in which he requests permission to leave 
and outlines his reasons for doing so, is, in many respects, a model of thoughtful, 
carefully constructed argument.  That said, Knecht’s analysis of Castalia’s limits also 
has its own limits.  His critique of Castalian hierarchy lacks a theory – or at least a 
well articulated theory – of power or politics.  Little is said about the sexism inherent 
in the Castalian system.  Castalia is not merely a hierarchy but a male hierarchy, and 
Knecht fails to render this problematic.  Knecht wishes to bridge the two spheres – the 
hermetically sealed “inner” world of Castalia and the wider outside world – but he has 
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only a vaguely formed and somewhat romantic idea of what life in the outside world 
entails. 
  
Knecht, then, may remove himself from Castalia, but Castalia continues to “live 
through” him.  He has, in Freirean terms, been conditioned but not determined by his 
context (Freire, 1998b, p. 26).  The structures, practices, attitudes and ideas that 
characterise the pedagogical province play their part in making Knecht the man that 
he becomes, but he cannot be reduced to merely the sum of these influences.  Hesse 
placed supreme importance on the integrity of the individual (see Hesse, 1974b, 
1978), and The Glass Bead Game is, among other things, a critique of the tendency in 
social systems to suppress individuality.  At the same time, Hesse recognised that we 
are social and historical beings, and his portrait of Knecht is consistent with this (cf. 
Wilde, 1999).  Knecht cannot shed the dominant influence of Castalia on his life – on 
his mode of thinking and being – and yet he is not merely Castalian.  Knecht’s 
conscientisation involves, among other things, the gradual deepening of his 
understanding of the relationship between “self” and “society”.  Knecht’s growing 
consciousness of himself is, as Cohn (1950) points out, a key theme in the novel.  But 
this is a consciousness of himself with others.  Castalia may have been the dominant 
influence on Knecht’s life, but others who represent and carry with them the outside 
world – Plinio Designori and Father Jacobus – also play pivotal roles in making him 
the man that he becomes.  The next section elaborates on how and why this is so. 
 
 
The role of dialogue 
 
Dialogue plays an important pedagogical role in the development of Knecht’s critical 
consciousness and is one of the defining characteristics of his relationships with Plinio 
Designori and Father Jacobus.  Joseph’s first encounter with Plinio is at Waldzell.  
Only the brightest of the elite students in Castalia attend the school at Waldzell.  
Waldzell is the home of the Glass Bead Game, and it is here that the Magister Ludi 
resides.  Plinio is a youth from a prominent family outside Castalia who is sent to 
Waldzell to experience the unique intellectual stimulation and learning provided by 
the pedagogical province.  Not long after encountering Plinio, Joseph senses that “this 
other boy would mean something important to him, perhaps something fine, an 
enlargement of his horizon, insight or illumination, perhaps also temptation and 
danger” (Hesse, 2000a, p. 86).  Plinio and Joseph begin what will become a lifelong 
friendship.  They become the key protagonists in a series of vigorous debates over the 
strengths and weaknesses of the Castalian system.  Plinio attacks the pedagogical 
province while Knecht defends Castalian ideals.  In their debates, Plinio and Joseph 
exhibit many of the qualities of Freirean dialogue.  They enter into their exchanges 
with a searching, probing, questioning frame of mind; they demonstrate an ability to 
challenge as well as to be challenged; and they deepen and extend their views through 
interaction with each other.  While their early exchanges are characterised by youthful 
exuberance and enthusiasm, qualities such as humility and tolerance come more to the 
fore with time and the advancement of years.  There is at first a sort of battle of wills 
and ideas, but this later becomes, for some of the time at least, more a demonstration 
of profound respect and a willingness to listen to and learn from each other. 
 
When the two protagonists meet again after being separated for many years, there is a 
certain weariness in both of them.  Plinio is weighed down by his political and family 
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responsibilities, while Knecht is burdened with his duties as Magister Ludi.  Knecht 
appears to adopt a somewhat condescending air in his conversation with Plinio.  
Plinio seems to be reaching out to him, seeking to establish a stronger emotional 
connection with his friend, but the Magister Ludi responds in a disarmingly 
“cheerful” manner.  He listens carefully to what Plinio has to say; yet he seems at this 
point to be still too much the representative of Castalia, rather than Joseph the human 
being.  Listening, as Freire sees it, is an important part of genuine dialogue.  It is “a 
permanent attitude on the part of the subject who is listening, of being open to the 
word of the other, to the gesture of the other, to the differences of the other” (Freire 
1998b, p. 107).  This is not merely a rational but also an emotional process.  Plinio 
cannot understand Knecht’s apparent amusement in the face of a heartfelt confession 
from an old friend.  At first glance, it is almost as if the detachment typical of the 
Castalian hierarchy cannot avoid seeping into Knecht, despite his clear differences 
with other members of the Order.  Plinio, as an outsider, experiences this more 
acutely than others who come into contact with Knecht.  Knecht responds, however, 
by saying: “… if I do not go along with your sadness …, that does not mean I don’t 
recognize it or take it seriously” (Hesse 2000a, p. 293).  As the dialogue continues, 
the two friends consider their differences as well as similarities and reflect on their 
earlier encounters.  Knecht is about to make the momentous decision to resign his 
position as Magister Ludi and he too seeks to strengthen his emotional bond with 
Plinio – but in his own distinctive way, with “cheerful serenity … even in 
unhappiness and suffering” (p. 300). 
 
Knecht’s relationship with Father Jacobus also plays a pivotal role in his subsequent 
development.  Knecht is sent by the Castalian authorities on a mission to a 
Benedictine monastery in Mariafels.  Father Jacobus is one of the monastery’s most 
respected figures, and Knecht develops a strong intellectual admiration for him.  
During his stay at the monastery, Joseph learns that he and Jacobus share an interest 
in the work of a teacher, Johann Albrecht Bengel.  They engage in a critical but 
cheerful dialogue about Bengel, “a fruitful conversation, out of which sprang mutual 
understanding and a kind of friendship” (Hesse, 2000a, p. 154).  As Knecht’s 
relationship with Father Jacobus grows and matures, the respect between the two men 
deepens: 
 
Jacobus enjoyed the exchange of views with so well trained yet still so supple 
a young mind; this was a pleasure he did not often have.  And Knecht found 
his association with the historian, and the education Jacobus provided, a new 
stage on the path of awakening – that path which he nowadays identified as his 
life. (p. 155) 
 
What does Knecht learn from Father Jacobus?  The narrator’s answer is that “he 
learned history” (p. 155).  “He learned the laws and contradictions of historical 
studies and historiography.  And beyond that, in the following years he learned to see 
the present and his own life as historical realities” (p. 155).  Arguably, however, 
Knecht learns much more than this from his relationship with Jacobus.  He sharpens 
his awareness of some of the limits of Castalian society, laying the foundations of the 
argument that will later underpin his Circular Letter to the Board of Educators; he 
develops a more nuanced view of his own strengths and weaknesses; and, 
importantly, he learns the value of dialogue at both an individual and societal level.  
Knecht’s dialogue with Father Jacobus provides the basis for a better relationship – 
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one of greater trust, improved communication and sounder understanding – between 
Castalia and the Catholic Church. 
 
Joseph and Jacobus change as individuals through their dialogical encounters.  Near 
the beginning of their relationship, Father Jacobus approaches their conversations 
with a certain aggressiveness.  Indeed, there is a degree of close-mindedness in his 
stance.  Jacobus adopts a reactionary posture, making belittling remarks about 
Castalia and responding to Knecht in at times thunderous tones (pp. 155-156).  He has 
spells of “angry unfairness” (p. 158).  He lacks, in Freirean terms, the humility and 
the open-mindedness necessary to engage fully in educational dialogue.  At first, he 
sees virtually nothing of value in the pedagogical province: 
 
Whenever he found something objectionable in Knecht’s way of thinking, he 
blamed it on that “modern” Castalian spirit with its abstruseness and its 
fondness for frivolous abstractions.  And whenever Knecht surprised him by 
wholesome views and remarks akin to his own thought, he exulted because his 
young friend’s sound nature had so well withstood the damage of Castalian 
education. (p. 155) 
 
Despite his youth, Joseph displays a calmness and an equanimity that is, in the earlier 
stages of their relationship, sometimes lacking in the older man.  Yet, on a number of 
philosophical and historical matters, Knecht cannot deny the power of Jacobus’s 
reasoning.  He is encouraged, in part by the initial ferocity of Jacobus’s attacks, to 
probe his own assumptions further and to ask more searching questions of the 
Castalian way of life than would have been possible on his own.  Father Jacobus, 
while too quickly dismissive of Castalia in his early conversations with Knecht, 
remains modest about his own achievements.  Knecht speaks with him simply as a 
fellow scholar, a colleague in the pursuit of truth.  He is at first unaware of Father 
Jacobus’s standing as a man of the highest reputation, constantly in demand for 
advice, “someone who was consciously participating in world history, and helping to 
shape it as the leading statesman of his Order” (p. 158).  Father Jacobus, like Knecht, 
values dialogue for its own sake as well as for the learning it facilitates.  Both Jacobus 
and Knecht love the very process of mutual inquiry, of exchanging views and testing 
one’s ideas in the company of another.  Over time, Father Jacobus comes to 
appreciate that Castalia and the Church are perhaps not so far apart as he had hitherto 
imagined. 
 
Hesse’s novel allows us to see more clearly how Freirean dialogue “works” in a wider 
educational context.  It does not do so, however, in a didactic or mechanical fashion.  
The three key participants in the dialogues that play such an important role in 
Knecht’s life – Plinio, Father Jacobus and Knecht himself – are all complex, 
multilayered, sometimes contradictory human beings.   They have character flaws as 
well as strengths, and these have a bearing on the nature of their exchanges.  At times, 
their conversations have an anti-dialogical character, with one or both of the 
participants lacking in the humility, openness or willingness to listen and learn 
necessary for genuine Freirean dialogue.  Importantly, the book shows how context 
and experience impact on the content, tone and consequences of dialogue.  Knecht, 
Jacobus and Plinio have all enjoyed certain privileges.  Knecht and Jacobus have been 
“protected” from some of the demands of the outside world by their respective Orders 
(Knecht more so than Jacobus), and Plinio has been fortunate enough to have come 
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from a wealthy family.  Their individual backgrounds, to varying degrees and in 
different ways, set limits on their thinking as they enter into their conversations with 
others.  Yet, through dialogue, something more than the mere combination of their 
respective views emerges.  Knecht, Jacobus and Plinio change as their conversations 
progress.  In all three cases, their view of Castalia deepens; all three, in distinctive 
ways given their different positions, come to view the pedagogical province in a more 
critical, balanced and mature light. 
 
 
Conscientisation and the non-neutrality of education 
 
The analysis to this point begs the question: what is the basis on which Knecht’s 
views (and those of Plinio and Father Jacobus) might be said to be “more critical, 
balanced and mature”?  Against what criteria can such judgements be made?  This is 
important not just in understanding Knecht’s transformation in The Glass Bead Game 
but in addressing some of the epistemological assumptions underlying Freire’s 
approach to dialogue and conscientisation.  Gert Biesta’s work on the “impossibility 
of education” (Biesta, 1998, 2005) is helpful in addressing this point.  The 
impossibility of education, Biesta argues, lies in its unpredictability.  Education 
cannot be reduced to mere technique or to a process of teachers moulding students.  In 
thinking about education we must take into account the ways in which students “use” 
what is presented by the teacher.  It is this “use” of what is presented that makes 
education possible – but also unpredictable (1998, pp. 503-504).  This has 
implications for critical pedagogy: 
 
If it is the case that the very possibility of education is sustained by its 
impossibility, then it follows that the idea of critical pedagogy as a positive 
program and project is problematic for two different reason[s].  First, because 
such a program can only be successful if it is able to control the ‘use’ of what 
it tries to achieve. […]  Second, because such a program would eventually 
imply an erasure of the political realm, of the realm where the risk of 
disclosure is a possibility.  This is the main danger implied in the normalizing 
tendency of critical pedagogy. (p.504) 
 
For Biesta, the only way for critical pedagogy to proceed, if it is to maintain 
pedagogical and political consistency, is to perpetually challenge all claims to 
authority, including those made by critical pedagogy itself (p. 505).  Such a challenge 
cannot be mounted in the name of “some superior knowledge or privileged vision” 
but can only proceed, Biesta suggests, on the basis of a “fundamental ignorance” (p. 
505).  Biesta elaborates: 
 
Such ignorance is neither naiveté nor skepticism.  It just is an ignorance that 
does not claim to know how the future will be or will have to be.  It is an 
ignorance that does not show the way, but only issues an invitation to set out 
on the journey.  It is an ignorance that does not say what to think of it, but only 
asks, ‘What do you think about it?’  In short, it is an ignorance that makes 
room for the possibility of disclosure.  It is, therefore, an emancipatory 
ignorance. (p. 505) 
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Biesta notes that this seems to contradict a key tenet in the critical tradition, namely, 
the idea that “emancipation can be brought about when people have an adequate 
understanding of, if not simply the plain truth, about their own situation” (p. 505).  
Biesta’s response is not to deny that change is possible or to see knowledge as futile.  
Instead, his approach “signifies the end of the ‘innocence’ of knowledge as a critical 
instrument, and thus the end of the possibility of demystification.  It urges us to 
recognize that we are always operating in a field of power/knowledge against 
power/knowledge” (p. 506).  Biesta advances a notion of “counter-practice”, a form 
of transgression as “the experimental illumination of limits” (p. 507).  He concludes: 
 
A counter-practice should not be designed out of an arrogance that it will be 
better (or that one claims to know that it will be better; once again: ignorance) 
than what exists.  A counter-practice is only different.  The critical task of a 
counter-practice can therefore only be to show (to prove, Foucault says) that 
the way things were was only one (limited) possibility.  But this step is crucial, 
as it opens up the possibility ‘of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we 
are, do, or think’. (p.507) 
 
This provides an intriguing standpoint from which to reconsider Freirean 
philosophical assumptions and Knecht’s process of conscientisation.  Biesta’s notion 
of “emancipatory ignorance” bears some resemblance to the Freirean idea of 
uncertainty.  Uncertainty, from Freire’s point of view, is ethically desirable, as is the 
kind of ignorance promoted by Biesta.  Uncertainty provides the “motor”, or impetus, 
for questioning and ongoing critical thought.  Being prepared to not only live with but 
embrace uncertainty affirms our existence as curious, inquiring beings.  Uncertainty 
on its own does not constitute critical consciousness (in the Freirean sense), but it is 
essential for it.  Biesta’s suggestion that emancipatory ignorance “does not show the 
way, but only issues an invitation to set out on the journey” is also largely consistent 
with Freirean theory and Knecht’s educational path in The Glass Bead Game.  Freire 
states emphatically that it is not his job as an educator to impose his political views on 
students; rather, his role is to provide the conditions for students to investigate matters 
of political significance themselves (see Freire’s comments in Escobar et al., 1994).  
Teachers, he insists, have a responsibility to not only allow but actively encourage the 
consideration of ethical and political alternatives.  The educational imperative, if it 
might be stated in those terms, is to make such a journey matter for students.  The 
point is not to prescribe (or proscribe) answers but to foster an educational 
environment where students will learn how to ask questions.  This, from a Freirean 
perspective, is where an important element in the non-neutrality of education lies: the 
favouring of some pedagogical dispositions – e.g., a willingness to question, to 
inquire and to engage in dialogue – over others.  These are the qualities Joseph 
Knecht develops in his process of conscientisation, and they distinguish him from 
some of his colleagues in Castalia.  Biesta, it seems to me, also presupposes a form of 
non-neutrality in his work, inasmuch as he favours (for instance) the possibility of 
disclosure, the value of interrogating our presuppositions about power/knowledge, 
and the very idea of inviting students to set out on an educational journey. 
 
Biesta claims that a counter-practice should be only different, not better.  Freire seems 
to suggest, however, that conscientisation involves the development of a mode of 
thinking and being that is preferable over some other ways of thinking and being.  A 
searching, questioning, probing, investigative, dialogical, critical approach to 
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understanding and living in the world, Freire implies, is better than, say, a passive, 
unquestioning, monological orientation.  From this perspective, it might be said that 
Knecht, Plinio and Jacobus all develop a “better” – more “critical, balanced and 
mature” – understanding of the world through their dialogical relationships with each 
other.  Freire argues against political prescriptiveness in educational settings but he is 
not an epistemological or ethical relativist.  Biesta cautions against the idea of 
believing we can or should “demystify” the world for others.  Freire does not want 
teachers to assume they have a right or a responsibility to clear away clouds of student 
ignorance; on the other hand, he also does not want teachers to pretend they have 
nothing of value to offer students in assisting them to learn.  Teachers have an 
important role to play in allowing students to see, in Biesta’s terms, that the way 
things are is not the only way they could be.  This is made more possible by some 
pedagogical approaches than others.  For example, if teachers were to encourage 
students to adopt or investigate just one view on a contentious social issue, when they 
are aware of well developed competing views, they would be at odds with the 
Freirean imperative to foster exploration of alternatives.  The Castalian education 
system does not prohibit students from investigating alternatives but neither does it 
actively encourage them to do so.  Knecht, through his dialogues with Plinio and 
Father Jacobus, as well through his own studies and reflections, comes to believe that 
many of his fellow Castalians are too narrow and rigid in their view of themselves, 
their society, and the lives of others in the outside world.  Knecht’s conscientisation 
does not, however, lead him to reject all he has learned in the pedagogical province.  
To the contrary; Knecht, by being prepared to ask questions, to probe further than 
most of his classmates and many of the Masters, and to enter into debates with Plinio 
and Jacobus, comes to appreciate more deeply the aesthetic richness and complexity 
of the Glass Bead Game.  Knecht does not, by the time he is ready to leave his 
position as Magister Ludi, see himself as having ‘demystified’ Castalia.  He has 
formed a more critical view of the pedagogical province, but he has also developed a 
greater awareness of his own limits and of the need for ongoing reflection, dialogue 
and action.  This idea is developed more fully in the next section. 
 
 
Conscientisation: an ongoing process 
 
A key element in Knecht’s conscientisation is his growing awareness of himself as an 
unfinished human being.  Knecht has a maturity beyond his years.  He is an 
exemplary student and scholar, a fine administrator, a respected figure among his 
peers (at all stages of his life), a thoughtful and caring person, and a brilliant exponent 
of the Glass Bead Game.  He reaches the very summit of the Castalian hierarchy with 
his appointment, at a comparatively young age, as Magister Ludi.  He has honesty and 
integrity, and abhors nastiness when he observes this in others.  In his Magisterial 
duties, he carries himself with dignity and poise.  In many ways, he lives the ideal 
Castalian life, fulfilling his calling to greatness within the pedagogical province.  And 
yet, Knecht’s decision to leave Castalia is made with a profound awareness that he 
has much more to achieve.  In this respect, he exhibits one of the key characteristics 
of conscientisation: an awareness of our unfinishedness as human beings and of the 
ethical implications arising from this (see Freire, 1998b, p. 55).   In his tenure as 
Magister Ludi Knecht had come to value, more and more, the process of teaching, 
finding his work with younger students especially rewarding.  This, he comes to 
believe, is where his key contribution lies.  He leaves Castalia with a renewed sense 
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of freedom – an open embracing of uncertainty – and a new appreciation for the 
beauty of the day and the world.  He has hope for the future and is filled with a quiet 
excitement about the challenges that lie ahead in his new role as a tutor for Tito, 
Plinio’s son.  He has come to realise that there is a whole new world outside Castalia, 
vibrant and complex, waiting to be explored: 
 
Life in the world, as the Castalian sees it, is something backward and inferior, 
a life of disorder and crudity, of passions and distractions, devoid of all that is 
beautiful or desirable.  But the world and its life was in fact infinitely vaster 
and richer than the notions a Castalian has of it; it was full of change, history, 
struggles, and eternally new beginnings.  It might be chaotic, but it was the 
home and native soil of all destinies, all exaltations, all arts, all humanity; it 
had produced languages, peoples, governments, cultures; it has also produced 
us and our Castalia and would see all these things perish again, and yet 
survive.  My teacher Jacobus had kindled in me a love for this world which 
was forever growing and seeking nourishment.  But in Castalia there was 
nothing to nourish it.  Here we were outside of the world; we ourselves were a 
small, perfect world, but one no longer changing, no longer growing (Hesse, 
2000a, pp. 378-379). 
 
Knecht, then, by his own assessment, remains incomplete and is eager to continue his  
growth as a human being.  This focus on incompleteness was arguably both a 
deliberate decision on the part of Hesse as author and a reflection of Hesse the man on 
his own path of spiritual and intellectual development.  There was a certain unity in 
Hesse’s life, as there was in Knecht’s, and the same themes find expression, in 
different ways, again and again in his writing.  But while The Glass Bead Game was 
Hesse’s last novel, and in this limited sense brought his work to a close, he continued 
to read, write and reflect until his death at the age of eighty five.  Hesse, like Knecht, 
could only ever find relative and temporary stability.  He was always, as Freire would 
have put it, a restless being, constantly curious, always striving to know more (cf. 
Freire, 1985).  Hesse felt from an early age that for him it was to be “a poet or nothing 
at all” (Helt, 1996), just as it seemed for Joseph Knecht to be Castalia or nothing at 
all.  Hesse may have gone through more overt trials in his school days and 
experienced greater difficulty in dealing with an authoritarian system of education 
than appeared to be the case with Joseph.  And while Hesse’s relationship with his 
parents was to leave its imprint on a number of his writings, Joseph’s parents may 
have died while he was still very young (the narrator leaves some uncertainty on this 
point).  But the seeds of change – of not simply accepting what tradition and authority 
had decreed – were planted for both Hesse and Knecht before they had emerged into 
full adulthood, and these were to grow and take more robust form in the decades that 
followed.  Hesse experienced periods of serious depression and even despair 
throughout his life (see Mileck, 1978).  He turned to the spiritual teachings of the East 
(while also not ignoring the religious traditions of the West), aestheticism and 
psychoanalysis for answers to the questions being posed in his restless mind.  And 
while the last third of his long life was in many ways more settled than his earlier 
years, there was never a point at which he declared or seemed to feel that he could be 
fully content, fully at rest, completed.  This, I believe, is what he wanted to convey in 
the book (and this view was very much shared by Freire): all of us remain incomplete; 
we go to our graves never having realised all we might have achieved, sometimes 
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with a mixture of pride and regret, but always with further questions and more work 
to do. 
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
In his later publications (e.g., Freire, 1994, 1997b, 1998a, 1998b, 2004) Freire 
stressed the need to keep “reinventing” his work.  This process demands that we not 
forget the circumstances under which Freire’s books were authored, and that we 
attempt to come as close as possible to understanding the deeper meaning behind his 
texts, while also accepting that other contexts and situations require new readings, 
different methods, and fresh applications of his ideas.  This paper has been completed 
in this spirit of “reinventing” Freire by applying key elements of his theoretical 
framework to Hermann Hesse’s The Glass Bead Game.  The central character in 
Hesse’s novel, Joseph Knecht, undergoes a gradual but profound process of 
educational transformation.  Knecht’s conscientisation mirrors many of the features of 
Freire’s educational ideal.  He develops a critical, questioning frame of mind, 
becoming “less certain of his certainties” as he grows older, and this leads to his 
eventual decision to resign his post as Magister Ludi.  Knecht’s dialogical 
relationships with other key characters play a key role in this process.  He feels an 
increasingly strong need to teach – to play a role in shaping and guiding young 
people, not just within but beyond the pedagogical province.  This distinguishes him 
from most of his fellow Castalians, who see themselves as separate from and superior 
to the rest of world.  Castalia remains a closed, inward-looking, rigid hierarchy, and 
Knecht struggles against this.  At the end of the main part of the novel, Knecht 
remains an incomplete being, and is aware of himself as such.  His sudden death 
brings his personal quest to a premature close, but it is clear that the educational 
process he has started will continue with Tito and others. 
 
It should be noted, in closing, that this is only one of the books by Hermann Hesse 
that lends itself readily to Freirean analysis.  Several of Hesse’s other novels – 
particularly, but not exclusively, Beneath the Wheel (Hesse, 1968a) and Siddhartha 
(Hesse, 2000b) – could also be examined fruitfully from a Freirean point of view.  
There are, moreover, strong connections that can be drawn between Freire and other 
literary figures.  Dostoevsky, with his searching exploration of philosophical themes 
in works such as The Brothers Karamazov, is one writer who stands out here (see 
Roberts, 2005), but there are many others who offer rich possibilities for analysis.  
For educational philosophers (and not just those concerned with Freire), the list of 
novelists who might prove helpful is extensive.  Leo Tolstoy, George Eliot, Virginia 
Woolf, Franz Kafka, Albert Camus, Jean Paul Sartre, Chinua Achebe, Iris Murdoch, 
Milan Kundera, Umberto Eco, Margaret Atwood, and Ben Okri, to name a few, have 
all, in different ways, addressed complex ethical, epistemological and ontological 
dilemmas – with important implications for education – in their novels.  By putting 
educational theorists into conversation with novelists – or the characters they create – 
light can be shed on both genres of written work.  Academic books permit the 
systematic, reasoned, coherent development of educational ideas; novels, or at least 
some novels, allow us to see how these ideas can be “lived out” in the thoughts, 
feelings, actions, relationships, and experiences of characters.  This paper has made 
only a modest beginning in this area, and there is considerable scope for further work 
of this kind. 
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